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• Conspiracy beliefs have a range of important political correlates and consequences, 
several of which undermine trust and participation in the processes of conventional 
liberal democracy 
• They are not the preserve of the ideological left or right, and are more common at 
ideological extremes, though may be strongest at the extreme right  
• There are reliable individual differences in a generalized predisposition to believe in 
conspiracy theories 
• This predisposition has been characterized as a conspiracy mindset, and more 
specifically a generalized political attitude 
• Problems with this characterization are identified and alternative ways of 






We consider the significance of belief in conspiracy theories for political ideologies. 
Although there is no marked ideological asymmetry in conspiracy belief, research indicates 
that conspiracy theories may play a powerful role in ideological processes. In particular, they 
are associated with ideological extremism, distrust of rival ideological camps, populist 
distrust of mainstream politics, and ideological grievances. The “conspiracy mindset” 
characterizes the ideological significance of conspiracy belief, and is associated with 
measuring conspiracy belief by means of abstract propositions associated with aversion and 
distrust of powerful groups. We suggest that this approach does not pay sufficient attention to 
the nonrational character of specific conspiracy beliefs and thus runs the risk of 




Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: Implications  
for political ideology 
More and more, conspiracy theories seem to permeate politics. It is fitting, therefore, 
that researchers in the behavioral sciences are paying more and more attention to them. 
Despite an explosion of research into conspiracy theories in recent years, and the appearance 
of several review articles [1, 2, 3], no review has yet focused on their ideological 
significance. In this article, we review recent research and theorizing to address important 
questions concerning the interplay between conspiracy theories and ideology. We address, for 
example, where on the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum conspiracy believers are 
most likely to be found, and how conspiracy theories shape ideological conflict, competition, 
and compromise. We also address how the ideological significance of conspiracy beliefs is 
being theorized. Like many episodes of rapid explanation, the growth of research on 
conspiracy theories has witnessed enormous creativity and industry, with less emphasis on 
deliberate reflection. The profusion of constructs, measures, hypotheses, and theoretical 
perspectives has outpaced efforts to prune or critique them. Thus, we offer some critical 
observations about arguably the most directly relevant theoretical perspective on the 
ideological character of conspiracy belief—namely the view that beliefs in conspiracy 
theories comprise (or arise from) a conspiracy mindset.  
Conspiracy belief, politics, and ideology 
Conspiracy beliefs are to be found on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Leaders 
from Chavez [4] to Trump and Bolsonaro have made use of them. Specific conspiracy 
theories have clearly had distinct political implications, and have resonated with distinct 
political ideologies. They appear to have been part and parcel, for example, of Americans’ 
distrust of government throughout the 20th and 21st centuries [5]. Antisemitic [6], and more 
recently Islamophobic conspiracy theories [7], have been important in right-wing and 
 5 
nationalistic thinking, and may have helped animate political events such as Brexit. 
Conspiracy theories appear on both sides of the ideological divide surrounding climate 
change—free-market conservatives in the US perceive an alarmist hoax cooked up by 
governments and scientists, while environmentalists perceive a motivated effort to discredit 
the science, cooked up by the oil industry and its stooges [8].   
Though different conspiracy theories clearly appeal to different audiences and may 
have different effects [9], they share underlying properties. In general, conspiracy theories are 
defined as “attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events 
and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors” [2, p.4]. One 
of the earliest and most robust findings to emerge from research on the psychology of 
conspiracy theories is that people who believe one conspiracy theory are likely to believe 
others [10]. This finding is so robust that researchers often measure conspiracy beliefs by 
presenting participants with conspiracy theories spanning topics as diverse as alien cover-ups, 
the deaths of John F. Kennedy and Princess Diana, and HIV/AIDS [11]. Endorsements of 
these disparate conspiracy theories are so strongly correlated that they turn out to comprise 
scales with very good internal consistency (typically, Cronbach’s α > .80; [11]). The 
correlation between conspiracy beliefs is so powerful that it may survive even when 
conspiracy theories are mutually contradictory [12] (but see [13]).   
This robust correlation is very important. It shows that the causes and consequences 
of belief in one conspiracy theory are likely to generalize to others. This means that social 
scientists can theorize about conspiracy theories in general [14], and study questions like, 
“what leads people to believe in conspiracy theories?” [1], “what are their consequences?” 
[15, 16, 17] and “what is the ideological significance of belief in conspiracy theories?”.   
One way to address the last of these questions is to examine whether there is any 
ideological asymmetry in the generalized tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Few 
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studies have been devoted to this question, and more research is needed. Thus far, studies  
suggest that there is little difference between liberals and conservatives. Instead, evidence 
from surveys [18] and observational studies [19, 20] suggests that general belief in 
conspiracy theories is strongest at either extreme of the political spectrum, though it may be 
stronger at the right-hand extreme [18]. In other words, conspiracy beliefs appear to be 
associated with ideological polarization, rather than with liberalism or conservatism in 
particular. In turn, this suggests that they affect ideological intergroup dynamics, rather than 
reinforcing any ideology in particular.  
This conclusion is reinforced by research into the tendency to believe in conspiracy 
theories in a selective or partisan fashion. In the US for example, conservatives are more 
likely to believe that Barack Obama was not born in their country while liberals are more 
likely to believe that the Bush administration intentionally lied about Iraq’s possession of 
weapons of mass destruction [21]. As we might expect from research on motivated political 
reasoning [22], people on each side of the ideological spectrum tend to believe in conspiracy 
theories that discredit and impugn the motives of the other. This clearly has the potential to 
problematize relations between rival ideological camps.   
In this case, there is also some evidence of ideological asymmetry—conservatives’ 
belief in specific conspiracy theories may be more partisan than liberals’. In other words, 
they are more likely to favor conspiracy theories that accuse their ideological opponents of 
wrongdoing, and reject conspiracy theories that implicate their own side [21].  This finding is 
remarkably consistent with evidence that compared to liberals, US conservatives have 
historically been more partisan in their trust and distrust of incumbent governments (as a 
function of whether they are Republican or Democrat [23]), and may be ascribed to 
ideological differences in the ability or willingness to think in nuanced ways [24, 25]. 
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The association between conspiracy belief and ideological extremity and distrust 
makes sense when we look at the content of conspiracy theories. They imply that small, elite 
groups are malign, powerful, and unaccountable, and are responsible for shaping world 
events and political systems [26, 27]. They imply that institutions meant to provide 
democratic checks and balances, such as the civil service and media, are either complicit or 
ineffective [28], and will be unlikely to respond to the people’s demands for change [29].  
Since civic and political institutions cannot be relied upon, it makes sense to withdraw from 
mainstream civic and political processes [30], or to take alternative, non-normative forms of 
collective action [31]. In particular, conspiracy beliefs appear to resonate not only with 
ideological extremity but with populism, which casts ‘people’ as the homogenous, benign 
victims of malign political forces, and which resists location on a unidimensional liberal-
conservative spectrum [32]. Importantly, conspiracy theories may make it more difficult for 
the losing side in any political process to accept their loss [20].    
In sum, conspiracy theories do not seem to resonate specifically with either liberalism 
or conservatism. However, they appear highly relevant to the political contest between these 
ideologies, moving it away from the regulated processes of normative political activities and 
the seeking of moderation, compromise, and consensus. Their net effect is likely to be 
political polarization, prejudice, and grievance. Thus, although conspiracy theories often 
involve the open and exuberant critique of powerful interests, their unchallenged 
dissemination and uncritical consumption may represent a threat to democracy [29]. With this 
in mind, we now turn to a critique of the most relevant account of the political and 
ideological character of conspiracy belief so far—that of the conspiracy mindset.   
Theorizing the ideological relevance of conspiracy beliefs  
Imhoff and Bruder [26] postulate that there is a “conspiracy mindset… associated 
with disliking powerful societal groups and perceiving them as responsible for political and 
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economic events with negative implications” (p. 26). They argue that this mindset is a 
“generalised political attitude” (p. 39), related to but distinct from other generalized political 
attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism. Indeed, they found evidence for this argument, 
and also found that conspiracy mindset predicted specific political attitudes, such as anti-
American and anti-capitalist attitudes. In describing conspiracy belief as comprising (or 
arising from) a mindset, this approach follows scholars across disciplines [10, 20, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 37]. However, the mindset construct is importantly ambiguous in both lay meaning and 
psychological theory. It can refer (among other things) to a set of cognitive processes, or to a 
set of beliefs. Making the ambiguity worse, authors seldom explicate what they mean by 
these general terms, nor do they discuss their origins in psychological theory [38]. How, then, 
should we see a conspiracy mindset? Is it a set of cognitive processes, or a set of beliefs?   
One of the most influential theories of a conspiracy mindset captures both meanings. 
Goertzel [10] argued that each conspiracy belief adopted by an individual reinforces other 
conspiracy beliefs, and makes the individual more receptive to conspiracy theories that they 
may encounter later. Goertzel argued that people with this self-reinforcing “monological” 
belief system prefer explanations of an event according to their consistency with conspiracy 
theories about other events, rather than available evidence relating to the event itself. For 
example, one does not need to know all the facts to decide whether 9/11 was an inside job; 
one only needs to “know” that the moon landings were faked, and that the CIA was complicit 
in the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Unfortunately, this account has several problems 
[14, 39], not least evidence that conspiracy believers may be more, rather than less, open to 
experience [40], and more, rather than less, concerned with the specific facts of controversial 
cases such as the 9/11 attacks [41]. 
In contrast, other scholars have proposed that a conspiracy mindset comprises a set of 
specific beliefs held together by a general, “nuclear idea” [12, p.771]. In this vein, Popper 
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[27] argued that conspiracy beliefs are sustained by a “conspiracy theory of history”—
namely, the belief that the course of history is determined by the will of a few powerful 
individuals and groups. Thus, the Nazi regime believed that the defeat and humiliation of 
Germany had been orchestrated by Jews and Bolsheviks. In turn they believed that by 
following the will of their leader, they could not only reverse their fortunes but install a new 
and enduring utopia—effectively countering one grand conspiracy with their own. The 
characterization of conspiracy beliefs as a political attitude [26] seems to be an example of 
this kind of mindset. When researchers set out to measure it, they generally construct scales 
that are relatively abstract and generic (e.g., “A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest” [34], see also 26, 42]), distinct from other 
more specific measures of conspiracy belief (e.g., “The Apollo moon landings never 
happened and were staged in a Hollywood film studio” [11]).  
Another important ambiguity confronts this type of conspiracy mindset. Sometimes, 
researchers attempt to explain why people believe in specific conspiracy theories. For 
example, conspiracy belief has been described as being “un[der]pinned by a relatively small 
number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity” [34, p.1]. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that “the endorsement of specific conspiracy theories depends 
to a large extent on individual differences in the general tendency to adopt such beliefs” [43, 
p.1]. Further, a measure of “conspiracy mentality” has been tested as a predictor of belief in a 
set of specific conspiracy theories [42]. At other times, the conspiracy mindset may be 
intended merely as a way of characterizing a predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories 
[26]. In this instance, the latent variable underlying measures of conspiracy mindset and those 
underlying belief in multiple, specific conspiracy theories may well be one and the same, and 
it would be circular to hypothesize that a conspiracy mindset causes conspiracy beliefs.  
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Resolving this theoretical ambiguity is difficult. To date, there is no evidence that a 
conspiracy mindset is psychometrically distinct from, or causative of, conspiracy beliefs.  
Therefore, the hypothesis that it underpins conspiracy beliefs is viable in principle, but has 
yet to be supported. On the other hand, if the conspiracy mindset is meant to be a 
characterization rather than a causal account of conspiracy belief, its conceptual contribution 
to the literature on conspiracy belief is arguably heuristic or didactic, insofar as no new 
variable or process is being introduced. Similarly, its empirical contribution is essentially 
psychometric insofar as it introduces a new more abstract measure of conspiracy belief. Thus 
far, the evidence does not show that measures of conspiracy mindset capture conspiracy 
belief better than other measures [11]. Nonetheless, they have the advantage of applicability 
across time and contexts.  
A more serious problem may be that the conspiracy mindset runs the risk of 
mischaracterizing belief in conspiracy theories. Specific conspiracy theories tend to have a 
number of features that, all else equal, make them less reliable than other explanations. For 
example, they often stem from unreliable and unaccountable sources, and require that a 
number of alleged conspirators executed their roles competently and have since held their 
silence [44]. The normative disadvantages of conspiracy theories help explain why indices of 
irrational or nonrational thinking, and reduced willingness or ability to process, are associated 
with belief in them [1, 4, 45, 46]. Therefore, while the conspiracy mindset is defined as a 
political attitude, it could also be defined as comprising a general susceptibility to 
implausible beliefs [47]. This susceptibility may be lost in more abstract measures.  
This is important for two reasons. First, defining and measuring the conspiracy 
mindset only as a political attitude, and not also as a susceptibility, alters its psychological 
character, and likely causes it to deviate conceptually and empirically from belief in specific 
conspiracy theories. Indeed, one recent study found that a measure of conspiracy mindset, but 
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not an aggregate measure of conspiracy beliefs, was negatively related to education and 
rational thinking [48]. Second, it also alters the ideological character of the tendency to 
believe in conspiracy theories, since lower education, cognitive ability, and reduced 
willingness to think critically have been associated with both conservatism and extremism 
[24, 25, 49, 50] and since conspiracy theories may form part of an ideologically relevant 
contemporary epistemic lassitude incorporating misinformation and “fake news” [50]. The 
predisposition to believe in specific conspiracy theories may therefore turn out to interact 
with ideology quite differently from measures of conspiracy mindset.  
Conclusion 
Conspiracy theories are of undoubted political and ideological significance. Although 
they are found across the ideological spectrum, they are more prevalent at its extremes, and 
likely contribute to ideological polarization, prejudice, and grievance. The notion that 
conspiracy beliefs comprise a political attitude or mindset represents a much needed effort to 
build theory and has already generated important insights and discoveries. However, it has 
some important limitations, including ambiguity about whether it attempts to explain or 
merely describe belief in conspiracy theories. Further, belief in conspiracy theories clearly 
represents not only an attitudinal disposition but a tendency to subscribe to normatively weak 
beliefs, and is the outcome, like ideological orientations, of cognitive styles and cognitive 
limitations. It is important that theorizing about the political and ideological character of 
conspiracy theories does not ignore this, even as it builds on the insight that conspiracy 
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